

Award Fee Determination Scorecard

Contractor:	Savannah River Remediation, LLC
Contract:	Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
Contract Number:	DE-AC09-09SR22505
Award Period:	October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014
Basis of Evaluation:	Performance and Evaluation Plan (PEMP)
Award Fee:	\$3,000,000.00
Incentive Fee:	\$22,500,000.00
Forfeiture of Fee:	(\$27,092.00)
Total Fee Available:	\$28,500,000.00
Total Fee Earned:	\$26,825,795.00
Percentage Fee Earned:	95%

This is a Cost Plus Award Fee contract as defined by Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Fee is made available for the completion of explicit work results, such as completing a task on time, or for implicit performance in areas of cost, schedule/timeliness, quality and business relations. Fee may be earned based on an annual evaluation of contract performance. Total Available Fee for each contract year is identified in the Performance Evaluation Measurement Plan (PEMP). Fee-bearing work is assigned an award fee component for subjective performance requirements or an incentive fee component for objective performance requirements.

Award Fee Component:

The Contractor earned 95 percent of the available award fee, which comprised approximately 10 percent of the total available fee for the evaluation period.

Incentive Fee Component:

Contractor work must be planned, funded and approved for each fiscal year, resulting in an approved baseline. The baseline work implements strategic decisions relative to Agency and Program initiatives.

The Contractor earned 95 percent of the available incentive fee, which comprised approximately 90 percent of the total available fee for the evaluation period. The contractor met the majority of performance goals and objectives for the period.

Additionally, the Contracting Officer determined SRR forfeit \$27,092.00 based on penalties incurred for replacing the project manager within two years of being placed in the position.

Noteworthy positive performance during the period included:

- Outstanding support to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) following a radiological release from the underground repository that occurred on February 14, 2014. SRR was informed of the event on Saturday, February 15. The first calls to DOE-SR occurred Sunday, February 16, and a meeting was held with DOE-SR representatives Monday, February 17 (Federal holiday). This resulted in personnel leaving SRS to support WIPP the following morning. Support was provided throughout the remainder of the year. Importantly, SRR managed this situation to meet one of DOE's highest priorities with sensitivity to maintaining performance on the LW program with no measureable impacts.
- SRR also performed WIPP lessons learned reviews for applicability to LW workscope as soon as the information was made available and well before requested by DOE.
- SRR's management of the lapse of appropriation at the beginning of the FY was exemplary. Approximately 1470 (about 80%) of the SRR staff were furloughed for 2.5 weeks due to this situation. SRR developed and executed a detailed plan for "imminent harm avoidance" staffing due to the lapse in appropriations resulting in the least cost and impacts to the Government. SRR's plan was used as the model for the M&O as well as other DOE sites across the complex. Throughout the process, SRR management was engaged, led by example, ensured safe maintenance of the facilities, and demonstrated excellent contract and workforce management. Similar management excellence was displayed during the February freeze event and loss of steam incidents and recovered from both.
- SRR management maintained continuity and chain of command during multiple changes in staffing of several key positions including the Tank Farms Manager, the Chief Technical Officer, Chief Engineer, the Deputy DWPF/Saltstone Area Manager, the President and Vice President.
- Partnering between DOE and SRR overall has been generally effective resulting in better relationships between staff members in areas such as system planning and modeling, tank closure, and the SDU 6 project. Communications between SRR and HQ is generally through the DOE-SR counterpart but some instances indicate the need for improvement in this area.

Additional areas of positive performance included:

- The SRR Conduct of Engineering Improvement Plan, implemented in response to prior year issues, has improved procedures, resulted in some improvement in interface/communications with DOE-SR, and has made some improvement in the rigor of SRR Engineering products.
- The implementation and operation of the MCU facility utilizing Next Generation Solvent has been exceptional resulting in decontamination factors significantly

exceeding prior operation and nearing that of anticipated SWPF performance. This results in reduced curies remaining in the State of South Carolina.

- SRR safety records remain among the best in the complex including, 6.6 million hours and 554 days since last injury requiring a day away from work, and SRR construction forces surpassed 16 consecutive years without a lost workday case

Notwithstanding these noteworthy positive results, some Opportunities for Improvement exist, including:

- SRR has an opportunity for improvement with identification of hazards, implementing controls and lessons learned. This is evident by the contamination events at DWPF and the postponement of work activities on the main process crane at DWPF. The latter issue resulted in the forfeiture of an objective PBI, however it did demonstrate management's safety culture awareness by terminating work scope which would have resulted in significantly higher dose rates that had been anticipated. Additionally, SRR was required to respond to a PAAA incident for lifting. The lifting event occurred at DWPF. A similar issue had been identified some years ago, and better application of lessons learned may have prevented this issue.
- SRR's overall management of the SDU 6 project experienced numerous quality problems with the prime subcontractor during the outset of the project, resulting in schedule delays that have yet to be recovered. DOE-SR assessments identified several areas of weaknesses that SRR should have noted earlier.
- During recovery from the freeze damage at the Saltstone facility, issues were identified with installation and use of Victaulic couplings, and as-built configuration. Additionally, some issues with proper grout pump sizing to enable pumping to SDUs 3 and 5 were identified. These were primarily legacy issues that were identified and properly managed to resolution.